Michigan Law Review
Volume 41

Issue 4

1943

ASSAULT AND BATTERY - DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
P. A. L.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
P. A. L., ASSAULT AND BATTERY - DEFENSE OF PROPERTY, 41 MICH. L. REV. 723 (1943).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1 943

J

RECENT DECISIONS

RECENT DECISIONS
This section is divided into two parts: notes and abstracts. The abstracts consist merely
of summaries of the facts and holdings of recent cases and are distinguished from the notes
by the absence of discussion.

NOTES
ASSAULT AND BATTERY - DEFENSE OF PROPERTY - In a suit brought
to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's husband the evidence indicated
that the deceased, and other intruders, entered defendant's place of business
after having been ordered to leave. The group "threw bricks and other missiles
at Gennaro, destroying whiskey bottles and other property, whereupon Gennaro
secured a pistol and shot and killed Wade." It was held that defendant was
justified in killing the inebriated trespasser.Wade v. Gennaro, (La. App. 1942)
8 So. (2d) 561.·
The case is of interest, in large part, because of its contradictory statements as
to the principles of law which govern, and the implication that life may be taken
in defense of property. True, the latter proposition is not stated in clear-cut
fashion; the court suggests an added justification, in the present case, of selfdefense. But there seems to be no doubt as to the fairness of the first suggested
criticism. Referring to an earlier Louisiana case,1 the court quotes "the law on
the subject''~ follows: "one who is himself in fault cannot recover damages for
a wrong resulting from such fault, although the party inflicting the injury was
not justified under the law." Then, referring to the principle which the plaintiff contended was applicable-that "a person defending himself from attack
is liable" when he employs excessive force-the court states that it applied "the
latter principle of law" in the very case from which it quoted the applicable
principle first stated. Then, as if to make confusion doubly certain, the court
adds that "no assault had been made" by the plaintiff in the earlier case. As
both of the principles stated relate to the use of force by a person d~fending
himself or his property from attack, the force of the earlier case, as authority
for the principal case, vanishes. Though the applicable principles seem rather
clear elsewhere,2 it would appear that a Louisiana lawyer, attempting to make a
prophecy as to the probable outcome of a case in this field, would be in somewhat of a quandary. In the instant case the court makes the suggestion that the
owner of a place of business is "not obliged to witness the destruction of his
property without attempting to prevent it." While there can be no quarrel with
that particular statement, it is usually said that defense of property is no justifiRandall v. Ridgley, (La. App. 1939) 185 So. 632.
Speaking of the privilege of self-defense, for example, Prosser in the most recent,
and excellent, treatise in this field says: "The privilege is limited to the use of force
which is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary for protection against the threatened
injury. The defendant is not privileged to inflict a beating which goes beyond the
necessities of the situation. If he does, he is committing a tort as to the excessive
force, and it is entirely possible that each party may have an action against the other."
1

2

PROSSER, TORTS 126-127 (1941).
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cation, in and of itself, for the taking of life. 3 Perhaps the saving feature in this
particular case, where life was taken, lies in the apparent afterthought implicit
in the phrase which follows the quoted statement: "to say nothing of the danger
to himself." In most jurisdictions the "say nothing" portion of the opinion
would be the "meat" of the justification for the type of defensive measures
employed.
,
P . .d. L.

3 Referring to privileged force in defense of property, it is said in PROSSER, ToRTS
133 (1941): "It is the accepted rule that there is no privilege to use any force calculated to cause death or serious bodily injury where only the property is threatened."
See also TORTS REsTATEMENT, § 79 (1934).

